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NOTES

The European Community's Second
Banking Directive: Can Antiquated
United States Legislation Keep Pace?
ABSTRACT

The European Community recently adopted the Second Banking Directive, which will lead to liberalized banking regulation throughout the
Member States. Community banks will engage in a broad range of activities including commercial lending, selling securities, and issuing insurance. This broad range of activities will allow Community banks to compete more efficiently in global markets. In contrast, the strict regulatory
structure of the United States includes the Glass-Steagall Act, which separatesinvestment banking and commercial banking. This separation creates inefficiencies that reduce the competitiveness of United States banks
in both internationaland United States markets. These inefficiencies are
highlighted by the innovative Second Banking Directive. This Note will
summarize the important provisions of the Second Banking Directive, including the s.ingle license system, which allows banks to operate in all
twelve Member States after they have been licensed by one Member State,
and the treatment of non-Community states or "third countries." Next,
this Note will review the history of the Glass-SteagallAct, its recent modifications by regulatory agencies and courts, and the prospectsfor congressional reform. The author then examines the effects of the Second
Banking Directive on the Community and the United States. Generally,
Community banks will consolidate and compete more effectively in the
international markets, including that of the United States. Finally, the
author argues that both United States and Community banks will benefit
morefrom continued United States regulatory action thanfrom sweeping
United States legislation.
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INTRODUCTION

The world economy is changing rapidly from local or national markets towards a global, twenty-four hour marketplace. Twelve western
European countries (Member States) have formed the European Community (the Community or EC)1 with the goal of unifying their markets

1. The current Member States of the Community are Belgium, Denmark, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United King-

dom, and Germany.
The original Member States were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-

lands and West Germany. On April 18, 1951, these countries signed the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in Paris. Treaty Establishing the Euro-
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so as to compete in this future global economy. The United States government, however, has not acted with such foresight, and this inertia is
apparent when one compares the United States banking regulatory
structure to the Second Banking Directive (the Second Banking Directive
or the Directive).'
Currently, banks in some Member States, such as Germany, are permitted not only to take deposits and make commercial loans, as United
States banks can, but also to underwrite securities, trade these securities
on the bank's account, and issue insurance. These banks, therefore, perform "universal banking." By means of a single license mechanism in
the Directive, the Community has adopted a process that will promote
the liberalization of the regulations of its individual Member States toward universal banking for the entire Community. The Directive is expected to result in greater efficiency of European banking and to the
emergence of five to ten "pan-European" banks that will be the global
players of the Community.3 The goal of the Directive is not only to liberalize the banking market on the continent, but also to liberalize the
banking systems in countries outside the Community where the pan-European banks hope to do business. Hence, the Directive enables the European Community Commission (the Commission) to enter negotiations
with, and in certain circumstances restrict the access of, other countries
that have a more restrictive regulatory structure. By providing the Commission with this capability, the Directive attempts to alter the banking
regulatory structures of countries that provide a potential market for
banks in the Community. A large market for Community banks, the
United States, which is governed by the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall),' has a more restrictive banking structure than the Community. As

pean Coal and Steel Community, done Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. In a similarly
integrative step, these parties signed the EURATOM Treaty. Treaty Establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. The
European Economic Community was created by these same six countries when they
signed the Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
Since 1957, six additional countries have joined the Community. Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom joined the Community on January 1, 1978; Greece joined on
January 1, 1981; and Spain and Portugal joined on January 1, 1986. See Jones, Putting
"1992" in Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 463, 464-65 (1989). This Note will
refer to these countries collectively as the Community.
2. Second Council Directive of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking up and Pursuit of
the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 32 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 386) 1 (1989) [hereinafter Second Banking Directive].
3. See infra notes 214-34 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
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a result, the Community, by means of the Second Banking Directive,
will attempt to liberalize the current United States banking regulatory
structure.
Under Glass-Steagall, the United States has two categories of banks:
commercial and investment. Commercial banks receive demand deposits
and make commercial loans; investment banks underwrite and trade securities for the bank's own account. Because Congress enacted GlassSteagall in the 1930s in the wake of the Great Depression, its critics
believe it is outdated. Today, many groups, including the Community,
would like to repeal Glass-Steagall.
Since it is more restrictive than the universal banking standard recently adopted in the Directive, the Community favors the repeal of
Glass-Steagall. United States banking regulators, with the aid of the
United States courts, however, have decreased significantly the separation between commercial and investment banking. Thus, European
banks will have substantial opportunities in the United States even if
Congress does not repeal Glass-Steagall. On the other hand, domestic
critics of United States banking law are concerned that the Glass-Steagall "wall" will impede the attempts of United States banks in their
attempts to compete with European and Japanese banks in the global
market. Presently, it appears that pressure to repeal Glass-Steagall from
the Community, as well as from within the United States, will be insufficient to overcome congressional inertia in the near future.
This Note will first examine the Community's goals in enacting the
Directive and the critical provisions of the Directive that concern the
single license and Community relations with so-called "third countries. '
Second, this Note will outline the history and current status of GlassSteagall, as altered by regulatory action to provide increased flexibility to
United States banks. Finally, this Note will review the likely effects, of
the Directive on both Community and United States banks and banking
systems.

(1988)). These sections are referred to commonly by their original section designations in
the Banking Act of 1933. The relevant sections of the Glass-Steagall Act are found at the
seventh provision of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) (Section 16), 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988) (Section
20), 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988) (Section 21), and 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988) (Section 32). See
infra Part III.A.
5. The Community generally refers to countries that are not Member States as third
countries.
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II. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE SECOND BANKING
DIRECTIVE

A.

History

On March 25, 1957, six European countries signed the Treaty of
Rome6 to create the European Economic Community.' The underlying
aim of the Community is to combine the Member State resources and
reduce their transaction costs to create a more efficient economic system.'
Part of this process includes liberalizing the European financial services
sector.9 Since the laws applicable to credit institutions vary widely
among Member States, the Community recognized, shortly after its formation, that total integration of the market would require the issuance of
more than one directive to guide the Member States. 0 The Second
Banking Directive is the culmination of an extended effort to liberalize
Community banking.
The first directive in this effort, the First Banking Directive,"1 serves
as the foundation for the liberalization process 2 and currently is in force
in all the Member States.'" The First Banking Directive delineates
6. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
7. See supra note 1; see also Mitchell, Unified Banking in Europe by 1993, 62
N.Y.L.J. 3, 6 (1988); Jones, supra note 1, at 464-65.
8. Lombay, The Single European Act, 11 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L.R. 31, 31 & n.4
(1988).
9. Oversight Hearings on European Community's 1992 Program:Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1989)
(testimony of David C. Mulford, Under Secretary for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treasury) [hereinafter 1989 Hearings].
10. 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11486.19 at 1329-8 [hereinafter CCH Summary].
Under Community law, a "directive" describes results to be achieved and binds the individual Member States to pass laws that will attain the ends set forth in the directive. A
"regulation," on the other hand, imposes restrictions directly on individuals and authorities in the Member States. Mitchell, supra note 7, at 3 (citing Treaty of Rome, supra
note 1).
11. First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking up and Pursuit of
the Business of Credit Institutions, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 322) 30 (1977) [hereinafter First Banking Directive].
12. See OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT, U. S.
DEP'T OF TREAS., EC SINGLE MARKET: BANKING AND SECURITIES (Aug. 1, 1989)

[hereinafter EC SINGLE MARKET].
13. Mitchell, supra note 7, at 6. The First Banking Directive was adopted December 12, 1977 and entered into force December 15, 1979. CCH Summary, supra note 10,
at 1329-30. Greece, Spain, and Portugal were subject to the First Banking Directive
upon their dates of accession to the Community. Id. at 1330.
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"common prudential criteria for the establishment and operation of
banks and other credit institutions" within the Community. 4 The First
Banking Directive, however, has few provisions for permanent supervision of these institutions.1 5 The Community subsequently adopted a directive on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis.16
Under this directive, the Member State in which the credit institution
has located its head office is responsible for supervision of the institution
and its branches throughout the Community.'
In February 1986, the Community adopted the Single European
Act,"8 marking a new phase in the evolution of the Community."9 Although the Community still had not attained the goal of removing all
barriers within the Community, the Single European Act set the goal of
eliminating the restrictions on the movement of goods, services, persons,
and capital between the Member States by December 31, 1992.2"
As part of the continuing progression toward a unified market in financial services, the Commission submitted a proposal for the Second
Banking Directive to the European Council (the Council) on February
23, 1988.21 On April 13, 1989, the Commission approved various

14.
15.
16.

21 BULL. EC 1-1988, pt. 1.2.1, at 12 (Apr. 1988).
CCH Summary, supra note 10, at 1329-9.
Council Directive on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated
Basis, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 18 (1983) [hereinafter ConsolidatedSupervision Directive]. See CCH Summary, supra note 10, at 1330.
17. See CCH Summary, supra note 10, at 1334; see also infra notes 52-61 and
accompanying text.
18. Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986), reprinted in 19
BULL. EC 1-1986, pt. 1.2.2, at 9-10 (Mar. 1986). See also The Single European Act, 3
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 20,000 at 9051 (Feb. 28, 1986).
19. See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 3.

20. Id. See also Paper by Interagency Group Airs U.S. Concerns Over 1992 Plan,
52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 49, 49 (Jan. 2, 1989). The Single European Act is the source of
the phrase "1992" used as the target date for Community unification.

21. Proposal for a Second Coundl Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulation and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 84) 1 (1988). See Cruickshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 345 (1982).
The Treaty [of Rome] confers the right of introducing a proposal for.., a Directive on the Commission. The Commission itself cannot adopt such a measure, but
has to submit it for approval to the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers cannot itself take the initiative in drawing up the proposal, but must wait for
the draft to be submitted to it by the Commission. In this way there is a delicate
constitutional balance, for neither institution can take action without the full participation and agreement of the other.
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amendments to the proposal22 and adopted them on May 29, 1989.23
The purposes of these amendments were to simplify the proposed Second Banking Directive, to increase the flexibility of relations with nonCommunity states, and to signal clearly that the Community wanted
non-Community states to establish bank subsidiaries in the Community.24 In simplifying the proposal, the Commission removed "reciprocity" 2 5 provisions, which required automatic suspension of any application from a third country bank for establishment of a bank in the
Community, and inserted provisions that provide for a case by case analysis of the treatment received by Community firms in the applicant's
country. 6 On June 19, 1989, the Council agreed on the amendments.27
B.

The Second Banking Directive

By its own terms, the Second Banking Directive is an essential part of
the integration of the internal European market, particularly as it relates
to the freedom to establish credit institutions and provide credit services.2 8 The Directive is an important member of a group of other directives relating to the operation and supervision of credit institutions.2"

Id.; see also Jones, supra note 1, at 467 ("Specifically, the Commission formulates proposals for Community legislation, enforces Community law against Member States and,
individuals, and generally acts as the executive arm of the Community."). There are
three other Community bodies: the European Council, which consists of the President of
the Commission and the heads of state of the Member States; the European Parliament;
and the European Court of Justice. Id. at 468.
22. 22 BULL. EC 5-1989, pt. 2.1.9, at 15 (Oct. 1989).
23. Id.
24. Commission Modifies Proposalson Reciprocity in Banking Directive, 4 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T95,113, at 51,197 [hereinafter Commission Modifies Proposals].
25. If the Community invoked the strictest form of reciprocity, it would require that
third countries provide exactly the same opportunities to Community banks that the
Community provided to the third countries' banks. See U.S. GOV'T INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON THE EC INTERNAL MARKET, AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN Eco-

NOMIC POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY ASPECTS OF THE EC's PROGRAM: A PUBLIC DIscusSION DOCUMENT 1 (Dec. 1988) (Internal Market Pub. Doc. 1288, Dec. 1988) [hereinaf-

ter INTERAGENCY REPORT].
26. Id.
27. Council Agrees Directives on Banking and Insider Dealing, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) No. 634, at 1 (June 29, 1989) [hereinafter Council Agrees].
28. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 1. See also Commission Modifies
Proposals,supra note 24, at 51,197. The Second Banking Directive establishes Community law for the first of three areas necessary to create a unified financial market. The
other two areas are investment services and insurance. McCune, EC Commission to
Launch Capital Rules for Investment Houses, Reuters (Apr. 23, 1990) (Nexis).
29. See Second Banking Directive,supra note 2. These other directives are: the First
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The Council has passed a three directive "package" concerning the general operation of banks, 30 the types of funds that banks must maintain,3"
and the amount of funds that banks must keep in reserve relative to the
bank's outstanding loans.3 2 The Second Banking Directive states that all
three directives must come into effect simultaneously." This Note will
concentrate on the Second Banking Directive, since its reputedly liberalizing intent has generated the most intense international debate.
The goal of the Directive is to establish a banking market "where
banks [can] operate through branches and provide cross border services,
restricted only by a minimum of limitations."3 4 The Community will
achieve this goal through the reduction of economic barriers for various
financial institutions, whose operations will include lending, leasing, securities trading, and underwriting.3 5 Through the single banking license,

Banking Directive, supra note 11, as amended by Directive 86/524/EEC, 29 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 309) 15 (1986); Consolidated Supervision Directive, supra note 16, at

18; Council Directive of 8 December 1986 on the Annual and ConsolidatedAccounts of
Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 372) 1 (1986)

[hereinafter Consolidated Accounts Directive]; and Council Directive of 17 April 1989
on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 124) 16 (1989)

[hereinafter Own Funds Directive].
30. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2.
31, See Own Funds Directive, supra note 29.
32. Council Directive of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratiofor Credit Institulions, 32 O.J. EUR. COMm. (No. L 386) 14 (1989) [hereinafter Solvency Ratio
Directive].
33. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 1.
34. Ebeling, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services: The Proposed Second Banking CoordinationDirective, 15 EuRo. L. REv. 60, 65 (1990). Some
Member States hope that the Second Banking Directive will "provide a climate which is
conducive to innovation, product deregulation and even a degree of legitimate competition

between regulatory structures." Brittan Callsfor More Open World Banking Markets,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 654, at 5 (Apr. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Brittan Callsfor

Open Markets].
35. See U.S. Businesses, Government Urged to Be Vigilant About EC Single Market,
52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 887 (Apr. 14, 1989) [hereinafter U.S. Urged to be Vigilant]; see
also Mitchell, supra note 7, at 3.
The Second Banking Directive includes an annex listing the minimum activities
that licensed banks should be able to pursue throughout the EC without any national restrictions. These activities include services generally associated with basic
banking activities, but they also include securities underwriting and related services and the purchase and sale of securities, financial futures and options for a
bank's own account or for the account of customers.
Id. The Annex lists the activities subject to mutual recognition. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 386) 13 (1989). Any institution may perform activities not listed in the Annex
under the general provisions of the Treaty of Rome. Second Banking Directive, supra
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which is valid throughout the Community, the Second Banking Directive
will reduce these economic barriers and harmonize both the recognition
of firms and the supervisory standards for banks. 6 By establishing
guidelines for the entrance of firms from third countries, the Directive
will allow the Community to liberalize financial markets outside the
Member States."
1. General Provisions
Article 1 of the Second Banking Directive defines important terms. In
two important instances, the Second Banking Directive retains the language used in the First Banking Directive. First, the Second Banking
Directive adopts the First Banking Directive's definitions of "credit institution" 8 and "authorization." 39 Second, the Second Banking Directive
refers to the First Banking Directive for authorization requirements 0
and maintains the First Banking Directive's provision that the Member
States will share information regarding management, ownership, and financial matters between the Member States.4 '
Aside from these provisions adopted from the First Banking Directive,
the Second Banking Directive also contains two significant innovations.
First, to open branches within the Community, a subsidiary needs to

note 2, at 2.
36. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2. See also Council Agrees, supra
note 27, at 1.
37. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2-3, 5-6.
38. Id. art. 1(1). The First Banking Directive defines a bank as "[an undertaking
whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to
grant credits for its own account." First Banking Directive, supra note 11, art. 1. The
Second Banking Directive defines a "financial institution" as an establishment that performs all the activities listed in the Annex to the Second Banking Directive except for
taking deposits. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(6).
39. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(2). An authorization is "an instrument issued in any form by the authorities by which the right to carry on the business of a credit institution is granted." First Banking Directive, supra note 11, art. 1.
40. First Banking Directive, supra note 11, art. 3. To obtain authorization, a credit
institution must possess adequate funds of its own, and at least two persons of good
reputation and experience must direct the institution. Id. art. 3(2). The institution also
must provide a program of operations that sets forth the type of business in which the
credit institution will engage and the structural organization of the institution. Id. art.
3(4). Within 12 months of receipt of the application, the authorizing Member State must
notify the applicant institution. Id. art. 3(6). The home country shall notify the Commission of all authorizations, and the Commission shall publish these authorizations in the
Official Journal of the European Communities. Id. art. 3(7).
41. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 8.
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acquire only one banking license issued by a Member State.4 2 Second,
the Second Banking Directive significantly relaxes43 the reciprocity provisions of the First Banking Directive. 4
2. The Single License
The Second Banking Directive sets forth criteria by which a Member
State may authorize the establishment of a bank.45 This unitary licensing
mechanism "applies the principle of mutual recognition of authorization
and supervisory systems" between the Member States. 41 Under the single license, Member States may no longer require that branches of subsidiaries which have a license to operate in the Community and wish to
do business in another Member State must fulfill certain authorization
or endowment criteria.47 Once a bank has obtained authorization and a
license in one Member State, it can operate anywhere else within the
Community, so long as the bank meets all the other requirements of the
Directive.' 8 The single license will make it possible for credit institutions
to tap a potential market of 320 million customers. 4'9 This system is feasible, because the First Banking Directive and a June 13, 1983 directive
concerning the consolidated supervision of credit institutions have begun
to harmonize the basic prudential rules for banks.50 The Second Banking
Directive is the final stage in the Community's establishment of a unified
banking services market and the linchpin of the legislative progression
toward this goal.51
Under the single license system, a bank may obtain a charter in one
42. Id. at 2 & arts. 13, 19-21.
43. Id. arts. 8-9.
44. First Banking Directive, supra note 11, at 31 & art. 9.
45. Commission Modifies Proposals,supra note 24, at 51,197.
46. See 21 BULL. EC 1-1988, pt. 1.2.1, at 12 (Apr. 1988); see also Second Banking
Directive, supra note 2, at 1.
47. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 6(1).
48. Id. A bank may not use the system to avoid the stricter standards of the Member
State where the bank intends to carry on business by obtaining authorization from another Member State. Id. at 1-2.
49. 21 BULL. EC 1-1988, pt. 1.2.1, at 12 (Apr. 1988). The Community, as a whole,
is the largest trading partner of the United States. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 73
(statement of Rep. Annunzio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs).
50. See 21 BULL. EC 1-1988, pt. 1.2.1, at 12 (Apr. 1988); see also supra notes 16-17
and accompanying text.
51. See 21 BULL. EC 1-1988, pt. 1.2.1, at 12 (Apr. 1988); see also Second Banking
Directive, supra note 2, at 1-2.
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Member State (the home country) and then engage in the "universal
banking" activities listed in the Annex to the Directive in other Member
States (host countries). 52 Mutual recognition, through the single license,
permits authorized credit institutions to perform these activities either by
establishing branches or by providing services throughout the Community.53 That is, the licensing home country, rather than the country in
which the branch is located or the service provided, determines the scope
of activities in which the bank may engage.54 All of these regulatory
innovations go into operation once a bank is authorized to do business in
the Community. Because an institution chartered in any Member State
may open branches and provide services without a host country's authorization, the single license is the "vital, element" in reducing economic
barriers.55
The goal of the single license is to create pressures within the Community for liberalization of the more restrictive regulations.56 In an effort to attract banks from third countries to obtain authorization in their
country, each Member State gradually will deregulate their banking systems and move toward the universal banking structure that currently
exists in Germany.57 Hopefully, this "competition of standards" will create uniform regulation throughout the Community.58 The Second Bank-

52. See EC SINGLE MARKET, supra note 12, at 2; see also supra note 35 concerning
the Annex. As defined by the Second Banking Directive, a "home Member State" is one
that authorizes a credit institution to operate in the Community. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(7). A "host Member State" is defined as "the Member State in
which a credit institution has a branch or in which it provides services." Id. art. 1(8).
See also Zavvos, Banking Integration in the European Community, 9 Nw. J. INT'L
LAW & Bus. 572, 574-75 (1989) (Banks must comply with the cumulative requirements
of home country authorization and engage in activities listed in the Annex in order to
benefit from mutual recognition.).
53. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2.
54. See EC SINGLE MARKET, supra note 12, at 2. The home country is responsible
for the general control and authorization of the credit institution. The home country is
also responsible for the supervision of the financial soundness and solvency of banks.
Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2. Host countries, however, regulate the
liquidity of branches and monitor the branches for the individual host country's monetary policy. Id. See also EC SINGLE MARKET, supra note 12, at 2. The Directive instructs both host and home countries to cooperate in the supervision of market risk. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2.
55. 21 BULL. EC 1-1988, pt. 1.2.2, at 12 (Apr. 1988).
56. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 5 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, ViceChairman, Fed).
57. U.S. Urged to Be Vigilant, supra note 35, at 887 (quoting Joan Spero, Senior
Vice-President, American Express Co.).
58. Meessen, Europe en Route to 1992: The Completion of the Internal Market
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ing Directive also may lead to more frequent contact between the national authorities and the managers of the financial institutions.5 9
Finally, while the Directive allows individual Member States to enact
laws that are stricter than certain provisions of the Directive, 0 the Directive aims to have strict surveillance measures without heavy procedural requirements.61
3.

Relations with Third Countries

In addition to the single license, the Second Banking Directive has
progressive standards for determining which banks may establish subsidiaries in the Community. The First Banking Directive provides that entrance into the Community market by non-Community credit institutions
will be based on the principle of reciprocity.62 "By proposing [the reciprocity] provision of the directive, the Commission attempted to provide
the Community with the ability to play a role as the progenitor of the
liberalization of financial services on a global scale." 63 Although it has
relaxed the standard for authorization, the Community has maintained
its active intent in the Second Banking Directive.6"
Reciprocity still exists in the Directive, but now the Community will
provide a third country's banks with access to the Community market if
the third country provides Community banks with national treatment. 65
In such a case, the Community first must negotiate with the third country regarding the treatment of Community banks within that third coun-

and Its hnpact on Non-Europeans, 23 INT'L LAW. 359, 366 (1989).
59. 21 BULL. EUR. COMM. 1-1988, pt. 1.2.3, at 13 (Apr. 1988).
60. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2. Member States may enact
laws stricter than the Directive in areas such as minimum capital, id. art. 4, ownership,
id, arts. 5, 11, 12, and secrecy laws, id. art. 16.

61.

Commission Modifies Proposals, supra note 24, at 51,197.

62. First Banking Directive, supra note 11, at 31 & art. 9(3). ("[Tlhe community
may . . .agree to apply provisions which, on the basis of the principle of reciprocity,
accord to branches of a credit institution having its head office outside the Community
identical treatment throughout the territory of the Community."). See also supra note
25.
63. Mitchell, supra note 7, at 6.
64. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2. The preamble states that "existing
reciprocity clauses will henceforth have no effect" and provides that the Community will
use a more flexible approach to assess treatment by third countries on a Communitywide basis. Id.
65. A third country provides a Community bank with national treatment when it
provides "the same competitive opportunities as are available to domestic credit institutions," Id. art. 9(4).
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try. 6 Even if the Community does not invoke the reciprocity provisions,
the Directive clearly states that the Community is interested in using its
more liberal marketplace as a means of encouraging liberalization of
markets throughout the world."7
Article 9 of the Directive provides the framework for a process of negotiation with third countries. Generally, the Community will permit a
third country to operate more credit institutions in the Community if the
third country provides Community banking firms with more access to the
third country's markets."8 Member States are required to inform the
Commission of any particular difficulties encountered in establishing or
carrying on banking activities in a third country. 69 In addition, the Commission must report the treatment that third countries afford Community
banking firms in establishing and carrying on business and in acquiring
holdings of third country banks." These reports are submitted to the
Council along with any Commission proposals six months prior to the
date the Directive takes effect 71 and periodically thereafter. 2
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 9 concern two events that trigger negotiations by the Commission. Under paragraph 3, if the Commission determines that a third country is denying Community firms "effective market
access comparable to that granted by the Community," then the Commission may propose that the Council mandate the initiation of negotiations with the third country. 4 These negotiations are intended to obtain

66. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2-3 and Title III. See infra notes 6895 and accompanying text. The Community can invoke the reciprocity provisions without negotiation only if Community banks do not receive national treatment from the
third country. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(4).
67. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 2-3 ("[T]he aim of this procedure is
not to close the Community's financial markets, but rather, as the Community intends to
keep its financial markets open to the rest of the world, to improve the liberalization of
the global financial markets in other third countries.").
68. Id. art. 9.
69. Id. art. 9(1).
70. Id. art. 9(2).
71. The latest date the Second Banking Directive can go into effect is January 1,
1993. Id. art. 24(1).
72. Id. art. 9(2).
73. Id. art. 9(3). One problem with this standard may be each country's subjective
definition of "effective market access." See Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Needed,
Economist Tells House Banking Task Force, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 721, 722 (Apr.
30, 1990) [hereinafter Comprehensive Reform Needed] ("[T]here is little international
consensus on what constitutes genuine equality of competitive opportunities or effective
market access .... ).
74. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(3). When there is not comparable access, the Council must vote for the negotiations by a qualified majority. Id. There
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"comparable competitive opportunities for Community credit institutions" in the third countries."5 Apparently, this provision was intended to
address countries, such as the United States, which afford Community
banks national treatment, but do not provide the same opportunities as
are available in the Community. 6 Restrictions, such as those embodied
in Glass-Steagall and those that derive from individual state laws, make
it impossible for the United States to provide these opportunities.7
Under paragraph 4 of article 9, whenever the Commission determines
that Community banks are not receiving national treatment,7 8 the Commission may initiate negotiations aimed at improving the situation. 9 In
addition, the Member States may limit or suspend action on pending and
future requests for authorizations and acquisitions by parents governed
by the laws of the offending third country.80 Moreover, the Member
States can limit or suspend the decisions on these requests for a maximum of three months.8 1 The Council may extend the three month suspension period if it acts by a qualified majority based on a proposal from
the Commission and the results of the negotiations.82 Paragraph 4 does
not affect institutions already authorized to operate in the Community
and attempting to establish subsidiaries or to acquire holdings in Community firms. 3
Article 9 allows the Commission to monitor applications from third
country banks, unless the treatment problem is resolved through negotiations. Whenever article 9 applies to a third country-when the third
country provides less than either comparable or national treatment to
Community firms-Member States shall inform the Commission when

are a total of 76 ministers on the Community Commission; a qualified majority is a

majority of 54 ministers. EC Will Turn to Reciprocity Weapon Only When Negotiations
Fail, EC Official Says, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 648, 648 (Mar. 13, 1989) [hereinafter

EC Reciprocity].
75.

Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(3).

76. EC Council of Ministers Approves Banking Directive Forming EC-Wide Single
License, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1387, 1387 (June 26, 1989) [hereinafter Council Ap-

proves Directive).

77. Id.
78. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(4). See also supra note 65 (definition of national treatment).
79. See supra note 64. When the third country provides less than national treatment,
the Commission does not need a mandate from the Council to initiate negotiations; cf
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
80. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(4), subpara. 2.
81. Id.
82. Id., subpara. 3. See also supra note 74 (discussing qualified majority).
83. Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(4), subpara. 4.
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any firm from that third country requests authorization either to establish a subsidiary or to obtain a majority holding in a Community firm.84
The Member State need not inform the Commission, however, if the
Community reaches an agreement with the third country or the time
limits in subparagraphs 2 and 3 of paragraph 4 expire.85 Regardless of
the behavior of third countries or agreements made by Member States,
article 9 shall comply with any bilateral or multilateral agreements governing the establishment or pursuit of credit institutions.8 6
The negotiation process of article 9 is a compromise between a mirror
image definition of reciprocity,' as initially adopted in the First Banking
Directive, and the national treatment standard, which the United States
advocates.8 8 Although the Second Banking Directive recognizes the national treatment standard, it advocates "comparable competitive opportunities," 9 which would allow Community banks, while operating in third
countries, to engage in services that the Directive permits.
The Second Banking Directive improved upon the First Banking Directive in several other areas, o but other directives are necessary to harmonize completely the Community banking industry. These future directives 9' will address the funds a bank must keep in reserve,9 2 the ratio of
these funds to outstanding loans, 3 management of large exposures, 4 and
deposit guarantees.9 5

84. Id. art. 9(5).
85. Id. The Second Banking Directive refers to a three month suspension of deci-

sions on authorization of new institutions or acquisition of an existing institution. Id. art.
9(4), subpara. 2. Subparagraph 3 refers to the extension of the three month suspension

by a qualified majority of the Council. Id. art. 9(4), subpara. 3.
86. Id. art. 9(6).

87.

See supra note 25.

88.

Council Approves Directive, supra note 76, at 1387.

89.

Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(3).

90. The Second Banking Directive requires a minimum capital level of five million
European Currency Units, the compulsory disclosure of information on major shareholders, and imposes a maximum level of involvement in non-banking activities (e.g., owning
industrial firms) not to exceed 50% of the bank's own funds or 10% on any one venture.
21 BULL. EC, 1-1988, pt. 1.2.2, at 12-13 (Apr. 1988). Further improvements consist of
structures for cooperation between supervisory authorities of different Member States.

Id.
91.

See 21 BULL. EC, 1-1988, pt. 1.2.1, at 12 (Apr. 1988).

92. See Own Funds Directive, supra note 30.
93. See Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 32.
94. Commission Recommendation of 22 December 1986 on Monitoring and Controlling Large Exposures of Credit Institutions, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 33) 10
(1987).
95. Commission Recommendation of 22 December 1986 Concerning the Introduc-

630

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 23.615

The single license of the Second Banking Directive opens the door to
the entire Community's banking market, not only for European banks,
but also for international entities. Entry, of course, may be conditioned
on the treatment of Community firms by the potential entrant's home
country. Another innovation in the Directive is the Annex,96 which contains a broad range of activities that expand the access by individual
firms to different facets of European financial markets. The Annex will
allow United States firms to engage in more activities in the Community
than they can at home. Because entry remains conditioned on a third
country's policies, and the United States banking market is more restrictively structured than the Community's, United States firms may have
difficulty entering the Community's market in the future.
III.

THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT

Although the Community generally is satisfied with the current state
of United States regulation,9 7 the Community will lobby to change several pieces of United States legislation9 8 that restrict the ability of Com-

lion of Deposit-GuaranteeSchemes in the Community, 30 O.J.

EUR. COMM. (No. L 33)
16 (1987).
96. See supra note 35.
97. The Community will permit United States banks to enter the Community market without further changes in United States legislation. The Community does recognize,
however, that the United States has a more restrictive regulatory regime than the Com-

munity. See EC Would Not Take Action Against U.S. if Banking Laws Not Reforned by
1992, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 591, 591 (Apr. 2, 1990).
98. Aside from the Glass-Steagall Act, the Community is concerned with: (i) the
McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982) (restricting interstate banking), see Greenspan

Says JapaneseBanks' FinancialPosition Are Undermined by Market Drop, 54 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 633, 633 (Apr. 9, 1990) [hereinafter Japanese Banks' Position Undermined]; (ii) the fact that at least half the directors of a United States subsidiary must be
United States citizens; (iii) the limits on a foreign bank's uncollateralized Fedwire (federally sponsored electronic funds transfer system) overdraft capacity, which substantially
reduces a bank's capacity relative to domestic banks, see EC Report on U.S. Trade Barriers Cites FinancialServices, Banking Laws, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 704, 705 (Apr.
26, 1990) [hereinafter EC Report Cites Banking Laws]; and (iv) section 4 of the Bank
Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982) (prohibiting banks from underwriting
insurance and securities), see Brittan Callsfor Open Markets, supra note 34, at 7. The
Community also has stated that regional compacts between states could become a major
problem. Id. at 6. An example of one of these compacts, which only allows banks that
have a United States owned parent to expand from one state into another, exists between

Florida and Virginia. See Time to Open Non-EC Markets, Brittan Tells Bankers'
Group, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 272 (Feb. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Time to Open

Ma rkets].
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munity banks to obtain "comparable competitive opportunities" 9 or the
same level of banking liberalization the Directive makes available in the
Community. This Note focuses on Glass-Steagall, because it is the foundation for the United States regulatory structure and the legislation most
relevant to the ability of United States financial institutions to compete
globally.'0 0 Moreover, Glass-Steagall raises the cost of capital for banks
and for United States businesses, because it reduces the efficiency with
which United States banks operate. This increased cost of capital affects
the competitive ability of both United States banks and the companies
financed by those banks.1 0 1
Unlike the Second Banking Directive, Glass-Steagall is conservative
and outdated. Its framers generally opted for such policies as safety for
depositors' money and the elimination of conflicts of interest over marketplace efficiency. Moreover, Glass-Steagall was a compromise;10 2 its
"purposes" were varied and have been disputed. Although United States

99.

Second Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(3). See also Community Looks to

Third Countriesfor Banking Liberalisation, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 651, at 6
(Mar. 1, 1990) ("The Commission will be vigorous in its determination to negotiate
away barriers to Community banks and other financial companies doing business
abroad.").

100. See Reform Needed to Help U.S. Banks Compete Here and Abroad, Clarke
Says, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 521, 521 (Mar. 26, 1990) [hereinafter Reformn Needed to

Help U.S. Banks].
Although U.S. banks are permitted to engage in securities underwriting overseas,
Regulation K stipulates that no single underwriting commitment may exceed $2
million or represent 20 percent or more of the issuer's capital and surplus or voting shares. When the EC integrates its financial markets in 1992, U.S. banks
could own EC banks as subsidiaries, and engage in a wide range of financial
activities permitted by member nations. But they would still be restricted by Reg
K ....
Id. The Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, Robert Clarke, felt Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1990), was overly restrictive. Id. On the other hand, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, did not believe Regulation K restricted competition. Japanese Banks' Position Undernined, supra note 98, at 633.

101.

Reform Needed to Help U.S. Banks, supra note 100, at 521.

102. Testifying in support of Senator Glass's legislation were the Superintendent of
Banking for the State of New York, the Chairman of the Board of the General Electric
Company, and a Harvard Professor. See Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the
JudicialProcess: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in FederalBanking Regulation, 85
MICH. L. REv. 672, 694-95 (1987). Banking regulators would not support actively Senator Glass's bill. Commercial bankers opposed it, and though the legislation was a part
of his platform, the newly elected President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was ambivalent
about it because of deposit insurance. Id. at 695. Support for a resolution increased,
however, as the public began to perceive that the bankers were to blame for the persisting depression. Id.
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interests and the Community favor repeal of Glass-Steagall, any legislation that replaces it similarly may suffer from compromise and special
interests. United States regulators and courts have made deep inroads
into the inefficient structures present in Glass-Steagall, and these continuing efforts may provide an operating environment for banks that is superior to one created by sweeping legislation.
A.

History

After World War I, the group of United States firms offering securities expanded from a close-knit group of specialty firms to include larger
commercial banks.103 Initially, banks had offered securities services for
the benefit of wealthier customers.'0 4 Often, banks established separately
incorporated securities affiliates to take advantage of less restrictive state
corporation laws. 0 5 As banks shifted their primary method of funding
from loans to new issues of stock, 10 6 commercial banks successfully competed with investment banks by drawing on their large capital bases and
networks of securities affiliates.10 7 By 1930, the presence of bank securities affiliates had grown substantially.0 8 The Great Depression resulted
in widespread bank failures.'0 9 These failures prompted Congress to enact the Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the Glass-Steagall
0
Act."1
Of Glass-Steagall's four major provisions,"' two concern the conduct
of banking and securities firms, and two limit the affiliations of banks
and securities firms. Section 16 prohibits banks both from underwriting
any stocks or securities, except as provided in the statute, and from investing for the bank's own account. Banks, however, may purchase and
sell securities upon the order of, and for the account of, customers." 2

103.

Id. at 692.

104.

Id.

105.

Id. Corporation laws were generally more liberal than banking laws. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Note, Requiem on the Glass-SteagallAct: Tracing the Evolution and Current Status of Bank Involvement in BrokerageActivities, 63 TULANE L. REV. 157, 161
(1988) ("[I]n 1930 commercial banks and their affiliates underwrote an estimated 60% of
all bond issues, up from 37% only 3 years earlier."); see also S. KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933 at 212 (1973).
109. Note, supra note 108, at 161.
110. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12

U.S.C. (1988)).
111.

See supra note 4.

112.

12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
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Section 21 prohibits securities firms from receiving deposits.11 3 Under
section 20, banks may not be affiliated with any firm that deals in securities." 4 Under section 32, directors, officers, or employees of a securities
firm may not, at the same time, serve as a director, officer, or employee
of a bank." 5 Thus, the effect of Glass-Steagall is to separate commercial
from investment banking activities." 6
In 1932, Senator Glass stated that "one of the greatest contributions to
the unprecedented disaster which has caused this almost incurable depression was made by these bank [securities] affiliates.""n 7 By separating
commercial from investment banking, the drafters hoped to restore the
public's confidence in the commercial banking system." 8 Lacking this
assurance, potential depositors would not place their money with banks,
and the entire economy eventually would fail." 9 Another purpose of
Glass-Steagall, cited by both commentators and the United States Supreme Court, was the elimination of potential conflicts of interest that
frequently arose when commercial banks engaged in securities
activities. 20
113. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988).
114. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
115. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
116. Note, Banking and Securities Law: The Glass-SteagallAct-Has It Outlived
Its Usefulness?, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 813-14 (1987).
117. 75 CONG. REC. 9887 (1932) (statement of Sen. Glass). Senator Glass was the
main catalyst of banking reform in the early 1930s. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at
693-98.
118. Note, supra note 108, at 162. Despite the fact that the United States Supreme
Court recognized this aim in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631
(1971), one commentator has questioned the weight that Congress gave to the restoration
of consumer confidence when it enacted Glass-Steagall due to the contemporaneous adoption of deposit insurance. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 690. Senator Glass
"strongly opposed .. .the idea of federal deposit insurance." Id. at 695. Professor
Langevoort also notes that Glass-Steagall's legislative history does not assume the existence of the insurance provisions. Id. at 690 n.60.
119. Note, Destroying the Barriers Between Commercial and Investment Banking:
Should Congress Repeal the Glass-SteagallAct?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1115, 1115
n.2 (1988) (citing H.R. REP. No. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933)).
120. Camp, 401 U.S. at 620. See Note, supra note 108, at 162-63; see also Note,
supra note 119, at 1115 n.2. Examples of this conflict of interest occur when a bank,
which has underwritten a failing securities offering, recommends that depositors
purchase the security. Id. at 1116 n.3 (citing 75 CONG. REc. 9912 (1932) (statement of
Sen. Bulkley)). "The depositors' purchases would save the offering, and the bank would
earn a commission on the sale." Id. The bank also might make unsound loans to help an
affiliate overcome financial difficulties. Note, supra note 119, at 1116 n.3 (citing Hearings Pursuantto S. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1064 (1931)). In another scenario, a bank might be tempted
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Though the United States is not currently in the midst of an economic
depression, its financial community faces several challenges including the
savings and loan crisis, federal deposit insurance reform, and international competition. Any legislation passed today likely would be the creation of similar compromises and might lead to similar difficulties in the
future.
B.

Current Problems in United States Banking

The competitive relationship between the banking and securities industries has changed substantially in the past two decades. In the early
1970s, the two industries performed very different services. 2 1 While the
securities industry generally provided investors with high risk investments with potentially high yields, banks provided investors with safer
opportunities and lower yields.1 2 By the early 1980s, innovation by the
investment industry in low-yield, low-risk products blurred the distinctions between the two industries. 23 In general, investors prefer to diversify both risk and yield within their portfolio. If an investor is able to
obtain this diversification through one securities firm, as opposed to using both a bank and a securities firm, then the rational investor will
reduce transaction costs and place more money with the single securities

to lend money to a firm in which the bank's security affiliate had invested heavily. See id.
Although these concerns were genuine, one commentator has suggested that any conflicts of interest could have been addressed by regulation rather than by a complete divorce of the commercial banking and securities industries. See Langevoort, supra note
102, at 690-91. Professor Langevoort points out that only one instance of actual abuse
was recorded in the legislative history, and it involved "grave personal misconduct by the
bank insiders." Id. at 690 n.57 (citing Camp, 401 U.S. at 617, 629-30). Professor
Langevoort goes on to argue that the only real problem occurs when "bank officers or
directors [have] a personal interest in the success of the securities affiliate or the issuer of
the securities." Id. Also, Congress may have perceived other conflicts of interest arising
from the banker's position as a fiduciary to the depositor. In this capacity, bankers were
to provide disinterested investment advice that could be undermined by a "salesman's
interest" in securities offered by the bank's securities affiliates. See Camp, 401 U.S. at
631-33. Congress also expected banks to act as "impartial sources of credit." Norton, UP
Against "the Wall": Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of Regulated ("Reregulated") Banking Environment, 42 Bus. LAW. 327, 334 (1987) (citing 75 CONG.
REC. 9912 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkely)). Banks, however, made loans to customers
with the expectation that the funds would be used to purchase securities from the
lender's affiliate. Note, supra note 108, at 163. See also Langevoort, supra note 102, at

690; Camp., 401 U.S. at 631-32.
121.
122.
123.

Langevoort, supra note 102, at 703.
Id. at 687-88.
Id. at 703. See also id. at 677.
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firm.12 As a result of the investment industry's ability to offer a wider
range of options, substantial sums were reallocated from banks to securities firms. 2 5
The effect of the Glass-Steagall "wall" was to relegate banks to the
field of low-yield, low-risk demand deposits and increasingly outmoded
commercial lending. At the same time, securities firms were expanding
into areas that virtually duplicate the services offered by banks. Thus, a
"competitive imbalance" exists in the finance industry in favor of securities firms.12
Currently, the only competitive advantage banks have over the cash
management accounts of securities firms is deposit insurance. 2 The
United States Treasury Department recently requested comments on the
federal deposit insurance system and its substantial revision.' 2 8 Thus,
banks are constrained by Glass-Steagall in comparison to their domestic
competitors, and if banks have any advantage on account of deposit insurance, it soon may vanish.
Glass-Steagall has increased the risks that banks confront because
banks are unable to diversify in the face of reduced profits. One reason
for decreased profitability is congressional deregulation of interest rate
limits.12 9 Prior to congressional action, this regulation had required that
banks pay substantially less than market rates on checking accounts and
time deposits. 3 ' The regulation assured banks a reasonable profit margin between the rates they paid to depositors and the rates they received

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

687.
703.
688.
709 n.125.

128. Commentators were asked to address limiting factors such as the scope or
amount of insurance and alternatives to the current system. See Treasury Invites Comments on FIRREA Mandated Study of Deposit Insurance, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA)
869, 869-70 (Dec. 11, 1989). Also, commentators were questioned regarding the number
of insured accounts one depositor may have at one institution, and were asked to compare
United States and foreign insurance systems, auditing, and accounting procedures. Senate
Banking Will Focus on Deposit Insurance, International Competitiveness, 54 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 430, 430 (Mar. 12, 1990). The Bush Administration believes that any re-

structuring of the financial services industry must include revision of the deposit insurance system. Id. See also President'sAnnual Economic Report Highlights Deposit Insurance Reform, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 239, 239 (Feb. 12, 1990) ("Glass-Steagall
initiatives, and those related to deposit insurance cannot be considered separately from
one another ....).
129. Langevoort, supra note 102, at 681 (summarizing the effect of eliminating Regulation Q, 12 C.FR. § 217 (1990)).

130. Id.
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from borrowers. 3 1 As unregulated interest rates rose with inflation in
the 1970s, Congress eliminated the regulated rate limits, forcing banks to
pay higher market rates to depositors.1 3 2 To compensate for reduced
profit margins, banks incurred greater risks.13 3 As banks undertook these
increased risks, the Glass-Steagall separation remained, prohibiting
banks from diversifying.1 34 The inability to diversify is one of the greatest risks faced by United States banks as a result of the Glass-Steagall
"wall.1'1 3 5 Pressures from both international and domestic non-banking
institutions will strain United States banks if they are not allowed to
expand and diversify. 3
As for international competition, one Congressman noted that a decrease in competitiveness by United States banks could impair the ability
of United States manufacturers to sell their goods overseas, which would
lead to further erosion of the United States economy.13 1 One of the most
important factors for United States manufacturers, the cost of capital,
which determines a corporation's ability to seize opportunities,
is rela138
tively high in the United States compared to other countries.
With this in mind, observers are calling for the United States to follow
the example of the Community and comprehensively review the financial

131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 682.
Id.

134. Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the Risks of FinancialProductDeregulalion, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1985).
135. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 18 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, ViceChairman, Fed). Recently, one United States official stated that bank safety could be
achieved by a profitable system that allows diversification of risk. Id. at 14 (testimony of
Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency). Diversification by banks would lead to
increased capital for the bank and to a system that is safer than one "all chopped in
pieces where no one can make any money." Id. Banks and regulators view new products,
such as discount brokerages, as a way to stabilize earnings and reduce overall risk. Note,
supra note 108, at 159 (citing Litan, supra note 134, at 10). One researcher has determined that commercial banks can reduce volatility of earnings by 15% to 30% if there
were no barriers to offering innovative financial products. Id.
136. To help banks compete, regulators have been more permissive with capital re-

quirements. See Credit Quality ofMajor U.S. Banks Hurt by Shift to Securities Markets,
48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 152, 152 (Jan. 19, 1987). These lower requirements, which
increase the risk that a bank will be unable to survive an economic shock, coupled with
lower profitability of the core business of banking, have led a leading bond rating company to note that investing in bank debt is increasingly risky. Id.

137.

Rep. LaFalce Calls U.S. Banks Complacent About Need to Compete in Global

Market, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 721, 721 (Apr. 30, 1990) [hereinafter LaFalce Calls

U.S. Banks Complacent].
138.

Id.
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regulatory structure with the hope that it will encourage competition,
efficiency, and lower costs.1" 9 A United States official expressed hope
that Community integration will serve as an impetus for the United
States to repeal Glass-Steagall, because it will provide benefits both to
consumers with lower costs and to banks with the ability to diversify. 4"
C.

Current Status of the Glass-Steagall Act

Since Congress has not modified Glass-Steagall substantially, both
courts, and regulatory agencies have been the source of the expansion of
the areas in which banks may operate. By the early 1970s, regulators
had rejected a restrictive reading of some sections of Glass-Steagall,""
because strict adherence to Glass-Steagall's restrictions placed banks at a
competitive disadvantage.' 4 2 Some banking regulators, especially the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), favor the relaxation of
barriers to banks entering the securities field.' 43 The OCC's view stems
139. Comprehensive Reform Needed, supra note 73, at 721-22 (quoting C. Fred
Bergsten, Director, Institute for Int'l Economics). Senator Donald Reigle, Chairman of
the Senate Banking Committee, also supports the creation of an umbrella regulatory
body before further deregulation. ICI Urges Glass-Steagall Repeal, BHC Act Amendments, Narrow Banks, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 722, 723 (Apr. 30, 1990).
Against international competition,- United States banks have not fared well. "Since
1983, the United States is the only country of the major industrialized nations whose
total cross-border banking assets shrank ...... "LaFalce Calls U.S. Banks Complacent,
supra note 137, at 721. Currently, 260 foreign banks operate in the United States, controlling 25% of United States bank assets and 27% of the United States business loan
market, while United States international lending has dropped 25% in four years and
United States banks appear to be retreating from the international arena, in general, and
Europe, in particular, just as opportunities are increasing. Congress Needs to Take a
Global View of U.S. Banking System, LaFalce Says, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 181, 182
(Jan. 29, 1990) [hereinafter Congress Needs to Take a Global View].
140. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency). Representative LaFalce, Chairman of the Task Force of the Financial Institutions Subcommittee of the House Banking Committee, stated that "only a tiny
handful" of United States firms were taking advantage of the integration in the Community. Reform Needed to Help U.S. Banks Compete Here and Abroad, Clarke Says, 54
Banking Rep. (BNA) 521, 521 (Mar. 26, 1990).
141. Fischer, Gram, Kaufman & Mote, The Securities Activities of Commercial
Banks: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467, 471 (1984).
142. See Comment, Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Going for Brokerage
Under Glass-Steagall, 4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 315, 320 (1985).
143. Id. See Five BHCs Posed to Underwrite Equity; New York Fed Bank to Review
Procedures, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 289 (Feb. 19, 1990) ("In the Jan. 18 order, the
Fed determined that bank holding companies could underwrite debt and equity securities
under Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act" after a one year waiting period.); see also
J.P.Morgan Gets Stock-UnderwritingPower, but Banks' New Role May Be Mostly Sym-
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from its perception of "fundamental changes in the economic and regulatory structure" that have occurred since the 1930s."' One writer asserts
that the agencies are amending Glass-Steagall by administrative fiat. 145
The agencies, however, are not acting alone.
Once Congress delegates the power to regulate the banking industry to
administrative agencies, the courts serve as a check on the agencies. The
courts generally have provided the banks with greater operating latitude
through the combination of literal interpretation of the statute and deference to the agencies. 141 When the courts interpret Glass-Steagall literally, they limit its restrictive reach such that opportunities for banks in
the marketplace increase.1 47 As for deference, most initiatives by the
banking industry require agency approval, and the agencies have accommodated marketplace change.1 4 Deference serves to reduce Glass-Steagall's impact.' 49 Although deference may not be the best analytical
tool, 15 0 it does allow the courts to incorporate the realities of the modern
banking marketplace into the framework of outdated legislation.
Through deference and literal interpretation, courts and agencies minimize "the frustrating and potentially dysfunctional effects that GlassSteagall might otherwise have on the development of the market for financial services.''
Agency action and court deference have expanded the range of services' 5 2 that subsidiaries of bank holding companies may offer. These
bolic, Wall. St. J., Sept. 24, 1990 at C1, col. 4 (reporting that the Fed granted J.P.
Morgan & Co. the power to underwrite corporate stock issues).

144. Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-Steagall Have for Today's Financial
World?, 95 BANKING L.J. 404, 406 (1978).
145. Note, supra note 116, at 826.
146. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 717-18; see also Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that the
Securities Industry Association has a weak argument "because of the enormous deference
we are obliged to give to the Board's determination that the activities proposed are
'closely related to banking,' . . . and that those activities will produce net benefits to the
public"); Banks' Securities Underwriting Upheld, Appeals Court Bars Relitigation of
Claims, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 660, 661 (Apr. 16, 1990).
147. Langevoort, supra note 102, at 717 n.144.
148. Id. at 718.
149. Id. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (outlining the Supreme Court's position on deference
to administrative agencies).
150. Professor Langevoort asserts that "the rhetoric of deference is invoked after the
court concludes the administrative decision is a sound one. In that sense, it adds little or
nothing to the analysis." Langevoort, supra note 102, at 718 n.145.
151. Id. at 717.
152. Note, supra note 119, at 1118.
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include retail discount brokerage services"" and institutional investment
advice and brokerage services."" In addition, non-bank subsidiaries of
bank holding companies may underwrite and deal in mortgage-backed
securities and consumer-receiver related securities.15 5 Banks may engage
in the private placement of commercial paper,1 56 and state banks, which
are not members of the Federal Reserve System, may have subsidiary
relationships with securities firms.1 57 Because of agency deregulation,
both United States banks and foreign banks are able to compete with
United States non-bank financial entities.
Although these actions by the courts and the agencies may appear to
be by "fiat," the alternative is no response to the changing market. Ideally, Congress is the proper United States governmental entity to amend
Glass-Steagall, but it has done nothing. Even if Congress passed legislation, it probably would be encumbered by compromise. Given congressional inaction, the contribution of courts and agencies, responding to
each innovation as the banks create it, is the best mechanism for "updating"158 the banking regulatory structure.
D.

Future Options and Risks

Members of Congress recently have noted that the separation of banking functions under Glass-Steagall has served the country poorly in recent years.1 59 Moreover,, the Bush Administration claims it is committed
to the repeal of Glass-Steagall.'" Currently, however, there has been no
real progress toward repeal.'
The stakes for United States banks are increasing as the Japanese
push towards repeal of their banking separation law 62 and as the Sec153. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
207, 216-17 (1984).
154. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d
810, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
155. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d

47, 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
156. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
157. Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1546 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987).
158. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 719.
159. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 39 (statement of Rep. Barnard).
160. EC Policy on Foreign Banks Seen Leading to Chaosfor U.S. Banks, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 647, 647 (Mar. 13, 1989) [hereinafter EC Policy on Foreign Banks].
161. Celarier, Glass-Steagall Is a Global Issue, 48 U.S. BANKER 72 (May 1989).

See Congress Needs to Take a Global View, supra note 139, at 182.
162.

Celarier, supra note 161, at 72.
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ond Banking Directive effectively deregulates European banking. These
outside developments emphasize the problems within the United States
financial industry that stem from the separation of investment and commercial banking operations.
The banking regulatory agencies also recognize the need for more substantial reform, but there is some disagreement over the extent of deregulation required. The Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
would permit non-bank activities by subsidiaries of the banks."6 3 The
FDIC argues that, by dismantling Glass-Steagall and the bank holding
structure and by insulating the banking functions from other subsidiaries, the United States could obtain a better regulatory "product" than
currently exists. 164 The Federal Reserve Board (the Fed), on the other
hand, argues that non-banking operations should occur in subsidiaries of
the bank holding company.' 65 In this way, banks would remain separated from non-banking activities. The Fed fears exposing deposit insurance and other safeguards to non-banking activities, 66 and argues that
"firewalls" should remain intact. These firewalls are designed to withhold insurance protection from non-banking affiliates. If protected by
federal insurance, affiliates could be afforded an unfair advantage over
competitors who are not affiliated with a bank holding company167
One private individual, however, has argued that Congress must insti-

163. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 145 (written statement of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC).
164. Id. at 21 (statement of Rep. Parris). See also id. at 144-45 (written statement of
L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC).
165. Id. at 20 (statement of Manuel H. Johnson, Vice-Chairman, Fed). See also id.
at 125 (written statement of Manuel H. Johnson, Vice-Chairman,; Fed). The Fed has
regulatory control over bank holding companies, but not banks themselves.
166. Id. at 17 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, Vice-Chairman, Fed). This exposure could occur if the United States expanded to universal banking too quickly. Id.
"[T]here are major efficiencies and opportunities [from deregulation] and we should seize
them, but we should not do it without protecting the exposure of taxpayers through the
insurance fund." Id.
167. Id. at 5. See Note, A Banker's Adventures in Brokerland: Looking Through
Glass-Steagall at Discount Brokerage Services, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 1498, 1528-29
(1983). Any attempt to alter radically the financial industry by way of repeal or substantial liberalization of Glass-Steagall seriously would disturb, not only the structure of the
United States finance industry, but also the structure of the government agencies in
charge of regulating the industry. See Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Comm. on Deposit Insurance Revision and FinancialServices Industiy
Restructuring, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 25, 1990) (Nexis) (Testimony of Nicholas
Brady, Secretary of the Treasury) ("As we explore the reform of our financial institutions, we will also need to explore the reform of our regulatory structure, although to be
frank, the inevitable turf fights involved may prevent the full achievement of this goal.").
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tute universal banking, both domestically and abroad, to enable United
States banks to "meet [the global] competition head-on." 1 8 According to
this individual, the firewalls are onerous and inefficient.'
If these
firewalls are extended to offshore operations, United States overseas securities affiliates would be unable to compete with European universal
170

banks.

Other individuals think that Congress need not ensure the access of
United States banks to the Community market, because negotiations between the United States government, industry officials, and Community
officials are sufficient.171 Still others believe that the United States should
address the problems of deficit reduction and securities deregulation
first.

72

Another option may be to pattern liberalization of the banking regulatory structure after European regulation, incorporating the experience of
United States banks operating in Europe.' In the private sector, United
States banking groups have established task forces to study the effects of
European unification on United States banks.'7 4
"No country can ignore what is happening around the world in this
area without risking irreparable harm to its own institutions."'17 Currently, Glass-Steagall preserves deposit safety, but that safety may be a
luxury the United States no longer can afford.1 6 Deposit safety forces
United States banks to operate inefficiently and to bear substantial costs

168. 1992 Poses Competitive Threat to U.S. Banks, Regulators Say, 53 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 464, 465 (Oct. 2, 1989) (quoting F. William Hawley, Director, Int'l Gov't
Relations, Citicorp/Citibank) [hereinafter 1992 Poses Competitive Threat].
169. Id.
170. Id. See supra note 100.
171. Id. at 465 (quoting Robert D. Hormats, Vice-Chairman, Goldman Sachs Int'l).
172. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 54-55 (testimony of Nicholas A. Rey, Managing Director, Bear Stearns & Co.). Another commentator has noted that since United
States banks can perform several non-bank functions outside the United States under the
Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1988), United States banks may push for increased activity
offshore, providing banks more latitude in the absence of legislation that revises GlassSteagall. Wallison, The Statutory and Policy Underpinningsof United States Bank Securities Activities Abroad, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 117, 123 (1986).
173. See Bradfield, Current Regulations Dispel Concerns of Glass-SteagallDemise,
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 445, 450-451 (1989).
174. EC Diplomat Says U.S. Should Seek Int'l Agreement on Banking Services, 52
Banking Rep. (BNA) 930, 931 (Apr. 24, 1989).
175. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 72 (statement of Rep. Annunzio, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs).
176. Id. at 8; 1992 Poses Competitive Threat, supra note 168, at 464 (quoting L.
William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC).
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that foreign firms do not incur. According to one United States official,
the presence of these unique burdens is the principal reason for the
withdrawal of United States banks from the international front.1, 7 Community integration and liberalization will exacerbate the impact of these
costs on United States banks. 17 One European official has warned that
ifthe United States does not coordinate its regulations with those in Europe, the United States financial industry will be of "reduced impor17
tance" in the global market. 1
IV.

COMPARISON OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE
UNITED STATES POSITIONS

The banking policies of the United States and the Community are in
conflict. The United States advocates allowing countries to decide their
own mutual policy, and the Community attempts to sway the policies of
other countries. This section examines the policies of both the Community and the United States and how they have affected each other's
policymaking.
A.

The European Community Position

1. Strategy and Goals
The Community policy towards third countries, expressed in the Second Banking Directive, is reciprocal national treatment. Ordinarily,
"countries offering national treatment to banks based in the European
Community will be offered national treatment for their banks throughout the Community." ' The United States claims to offer national treatment without precondition1 8 ' and sees the Community's version of national treatment as stricter than the standard adopted in many
multilateral agreements, 8 2 such as the General Agreement on Tariffs
177. 1992 Poses Competitive Threat, supra note 168, at 466 (quoting David C.
Mulford, Under Secretary for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of Treasury).
178. Id. at 464 (quoting Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
179. Id. at 57 (testimony of Serge Bellanger, Exec. Vice-President and General
Manager, Cicunion Europenne, Int'l).
180. Id. at 6 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, Vice-Chairman, Fed).
181. "In principle, our version of national treatment is unconditional, while the EC's
formulation allows for reciprocity." Statement of David C. Mulford, Under Secretary
for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of the Treasury before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs (Sept. 28, 1989), reprinted in TREASURY NEWS (NB-477) [hereinafter TREASURY NEWS].

182.

See id.
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and Trade (GATT). 183 The Community contends that it can impose
these stricter standards, because the banking sector currently is not covered by GATT.' 4 While some Member States would prefer to maintain
the strict standards to protect Community firms from outside competition,"8 5 most Member States want to exploit the Community's position to
increase negotiating leverage against non-Community countries and to
obtain greater access to foreign markets." 6 European banks will want
the Community to trade access to Community markets for access to for187
eign markets.
As adopted, the Second Banking Directive provides for negotiations
with all countries that do not provide banking opportunities comparable
to those opportunities offered within the Community.'8 By means of
this negotiation mechanism, the Community expects to change the prac89
tices of other states.1
2. The Effects of the Second Banking Directive on the European
Community
A study by the Commission has estimated that the liberalization of
financial services in the Community would boost Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1.5 percent over approximately five years. 9 ' This figure
is roughly one-third of the total Community GDP gains anticipated from
the entire 1992 program.' 9 ' The adoption of the Second Banking Directive by the Member States will have two principal effects on the European banking sector. First, there will be greater competition among
banks because financial services no longer will be restricted by financial

183. openedfor signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 TIAS No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
187, reprinted in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [GATT, BISD] (1969).
184. See INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 25, at 1; see also Paper by Interagency
Group Airs U.S. Concerns Over EC 1992 Plan, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 49, 49 (Jan.
2, 1989) [hereinafter Paper by Interagency Group].
185. Paper by Interagency Group, supra note 184, at 49.
186. INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 25, at 2.
187. EC Policy on Foreign Banks Seen Leading to Chaosfor U.S. Banks, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 647, 647 (Mar. 13, 1989).
188. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
189. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 43 (testimony of Robert D. Hormats, ViceChairman, Goldman Sachs Int'l). See Community Looks to Third Countriesfor Banking
Liberalisation,Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 651, at 6 (Mar. 1, 1990) ("The Commission will be vigorous in its determination to negotiate away barriers to Community
banks and other financial companies doing business abroad.").
190. TREASURY NEWS, supra note 181, at 2.
191. Id.
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markets, national borders, or distance.1 " This increase in competition
will affect previously well-protected market shares. 193 Over the long run,
lower profit margins that result from increased competition may induce
European firms either to restructure their activities or to expand into
1 94
third country markets such as the United States.
Second, greater competition will lead to a new class of five to ten
larger "pan-European" universal banks that will dominate the Community and will be the major Community banks in the global market. 195
These pan-European banks will be the market leaders in France, England, and Germany and also will have representation in all important
European economic centers.' 9 6 In addition, several smaller regional, national, or specialty banks will emerge within the Community.'
Despite liberalization and increased competition, the Community
banking industry will remain stable.' 9 8 The Community believes it can
protect both investors and its economy through effective and flexible regulatory structures.'
B.

The United States Position

1. Policy of Liberal Trade
The United States supports European integration as manifested both
by President Bush's agreement to meet with the Community's President
twice yearly2 00 and the United States Department of Treasury's endorsement of the Community objective of economic liberalization.20 ' Further192. Mitchell, supra note 7, at 6.
193. Id.
194. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 4-5.
195. See id. at 52 (testimony of Dr. Ernst-Moritz Lipp, General Manager and Chief
Economist, Dresdner Bank, AG); see also Sasser Predicts "Cyclone" of Legislation on
Deposit Insurance and "Too Big to Fail," 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 287, 288 (Feb. 19,
1990) ("European banks are likely to be larger after 1992."). But see Lascelles, Early
Alliances Fail to Impress-Towards 1992 and the World's Largest Single Market,
Fin. Times, Survey (May 9, 1990) (Nexis) ("There is no such thing as a pan-European
bank, and you won't see it for 20 to 30 years." (quoting John Tugwell, Chief Executive
of Int'l Business, National Westminster)).
196. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 197 (written statement of Dr. Ernst-Moritz
Lipp, General Manager and Chief Economist, Dresdner Bank, AG).
197. Id.
198. Brittan Calls for Open Markets, supra note 34, at 6.
199. Id.
200. US and EC Agree to Hold Regular Summits, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No.
652, at 7-8 (Mar. 15, 1990).
201. TREASURY NEWS, supra note 181, at 1.
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more, the Vice-Chairman of the Fed has expressed his hope that the
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations will "achieve liberalization of
trade and financial services."20 2 Still another United States official has
noted that an integration of the world market will lead to a stronger and
more competitive global market, benefiting all the countries involved. 03
Through its support for general market liberalization, the United
States encourages a policy of national treatment. 4 With some exceptions for national security,20 5 the United States provides foreign investors
with the opportunities to establish and operate banks on terms no less
favorable than those available to domestic investors in similar circumstances. In the financial services sector, the United States contends that
national treatment means equality of competitive opportunity 20 6 and
207
competition between domestic and foreign firms on "equal footing.1

202. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 6-7 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, ViceChairman, Fed).
203. Id. at 9 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
204. See supra note 65 (definition of national treatment). In a move to alter this
policy, a proposed amendment to the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, the
Fair Trade and Financial Services Act of 1990, S.2028, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
addresses situations where United States firms are denied actual national treatment.
Reigle, Garn Introduce Bill to Promote National Treatment, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA)
225, 225 (Feb. 5, 1990). This bill appears to adopt a standard similar to that of the
Community. The United States would first negotiate for equal competitive opportunities,
and regulators could deny the applications of firms from countries that deny United
States firms national treatment. Id. Although the United States has followed a policy of
unconditional national treatment since 1978, this bill would include a requirement of
"effective market access" by United States banks into foreign markets before the United
States would provide national treatment to foreign banks. The United States is in the
minority with unconditional national treatment, and this change may bring the United
States more international leverage. Administration Reviewing Unconditional National
Treatment Policy, Mulford Says, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 412, 412 (Mar. 5, 1990). See
infra note 208. The Bush Administration opposes this bill because it would restrict capital flows and increase protectionism. Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 5, 1990) (testimony of David C. Mulford, Under Secretary for Int'l Affairs, Dep't of Treasury) (Nexis).
205. INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 25, at 6.
206. Id.
[W]e provide foreign firms in the United States with the same competitive opportunities as domestic firms. We ask the same of the EC. We expect the member
states and the EC Commission to adhere to international commitments to nondiscrimination, including those contained in GATT, the Codes and Instruments of
the OECD [Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development], and bilateral FCN [Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation] treaties.
Id. at 1.
207. Id.
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Somewhat idealistically, one official has claimed that the United States
adopted the national treatment policy because the policy is equitable, it
sets an example as an alternative policy to countries that do not open
their markets to foreign banks, and the United States financial system
benefits from the dynamic participation of foreign banks.20' Underlying
national treatment are United States policies of free access and non-discrimination," 9 which are reflected in the International Banking Act of
1978.210 Through its policy of national treatment, the United States
"recognizes that there are differences in types of governments and regulatory systems," '21 and the United States seeks entry into other countries
on terms that each country sees fit to establish. The United States hopes
that the Community will structure its financial markets to provide
United States banks with equal competitive opportunities and freedom of
2
2
access. 1

Unlike the Second Banking Directive's negotiation process, the United
States has no institutional leverage to apply against the Community in
the event United States banks are denied access to Community markets.
Therefore, whereas the United States views its national treatment policy

208. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 5 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, ViceChairman, Fed). Although the United States provides at least national treatment, there
are examples of the United States providing "better than national treatment" to other
countries. Id. First, under the International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369,
92 Stat. 607 (1978), foreign banks are allowed to operate non-banking affiliates within
the United States, even though United States banks are not permitted to operate those
types of affiliates in the United States. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 6. This measure
avoided extraterritorial application of United States law to foreign banks. Id. In another
example, the Fed decided that if a foreign country's treatment of United States firms was
not discriminatory, it would deem that country to have offered United States firms the
same competitive opportunities to sell the foreign country's securities. Id. Also, geographic restrictions on banking activities are not violations of national treatment because
the restrictions apply to both United States and foreign banks and were adopted for
public policy reasons. Id. See also TREASURY NEws, supra note 181, at 3 & n.15. Private parties, however, have noted that United States legislation has been proposed that
would violate the United States own national treatment standard. 1989 Hearings,supra
note 9, at 54-55 (testimony of Nicholas A. Rey, Managing Director, Bear Stearns &
Co.). Mr. Rey referred to legislation that would impose extensive reporting requirements
on foreign acquirers in the United States and stated that adoption of this legislation
would hurt the United States negotiating position. Id.
209. EC SINGLE MARKET, supra note 12, at 6-7.
210. Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 12

U.S.C. (1988)).
211. Paper by Interagency Group, supra note 184 at 49.
212. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 10 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
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as a passively liberal outlook, the Community policy of reciprocal national treatment is a liberalizing and more active policy. Implicitly, the
United States prefers that foreign states and firms entering the United
States market do not dictate the terms by which the United States market
operates, since these entrants do not have the same concern for domestic
policy as United States lawmakers.2 1 The Community, however, with
banks that are likely to gain strength after 1992, wants access not only to
the markets available to United States banks, but also to the same types
of financial markets that are available under the Directive. The Community and the United States, therefore, are not in conflict over which
United States laws should be repealed, but rather over whether the
Community will impose restrictions on United States entrants to its markets if the United States is unable to repeal those laws.
2. The Effects of European Integration and United States Influence on
the European Community Position
Reciprocity was described as the proposed Second Banking Directive's
most controversial political issue.2 14 While the United States advocates
national treatment by all nations, it fears that reciprocity still exists in
the adopted version of the Second Banking Directive, since "access to the
EC market will be conditional on treatment of EC firms in third country
markets" through the negotiation process.21 5 Although the Community
will apply it more flexibly, reciprocity can be used against the United
States.2 16 Some argue that the ultimate purpose behind the Community's
integration is the protection of European markets," 7 and that reciprocity
could result in restricted access to the Community market by United
States firms.21 ' Although a Community Commissioner has stated that the
reciprocity clause "is emphatically not a harbinger of protectionism," 21 9 it
is not clear what criteria the Community will apply in judging whether

213.

See 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson,

Vice-Chairman, Fed).
214. EC Changes Will Have Mixed Effects on Fledgling Global Banking, Panel
Says, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 600, 601 (Mar. 6, 1989).
215.

TREASURY NEWS, supra note 181, at 3.

216. EC SINGLE MARKET, supra note 12, at 5. One member of the Bush Administration called the concept of reciprocity, once it was enacted into law, a "club in the
closet" to be used to force changes in the United States financial system. TREASURY
NEWS, supra note 181, at 3.
217. Hilton, The EC Threat, 15 U.S. BANKER 68, 68 (May 1989).
218. INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
219. EC Will Turn to Reciprocity Weapon Only When Negotiations Fail, EC Official Says, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 648, 648 (Mar. 13, 1989).
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Community banks receive national treatment from third countries.2 20 At
a minimum, the Community will use the negotiation process of the Second Banking Directive to lobby for more liberal banking regulations in
the United States.2 21
United States officials have warned that if the Community invokes the
reciprocity measure that still exists in the Second Banking Directive,
Community banks will face the consequences:
[T]here should be no illusions about the consequences of possible EC actions. If U.S. firms are discriminated against in the EC, there would likely
be consequences for EC national institutions. An obvious first step might
be to scrutinize the "better than national treatment" privileges which
2 2
many European financial institutions enjoy in the United States.
However, Community banks might be large enough that these sanctions
would not be a significant threat.
Although the United States disagrees with the Community's proposed
treatment of other countries,22 3 comparison of the First Banking Directive's reciprocity provisions 224 to the Second Banking Directive's current
"relations with third countries"2 25 shows that the United States has influenced the Community's position. The reciprocity provision of the First
Banking Directive received substantial criticism from United States interests. This led to an amendment of the proposed Second Banking Directive in April 1989.226 United States officials believe that the current
standard is a "quite substantial improvement over the original reciprocity provision.

'227

A more substantial United States fear is that Community banks will
220, 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 50 (testimony of Hideo Ishihara, Managing
Director, Industrial Bank of Japan).
221. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 43 (testimony of Robert D. Hormats, ViceChairman, Goldman Sachs Int'l). See also id. at 31 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson,
Vice-Chairman, Fed).
[U]nder current principles we don't have to adjust our existing standards for banks
to the European standards. All we need to do is provide them equal opportunity to
U.S. domestic banks under the existing structure. However ... European Community representatives will continue to lobby and press for a more level playing
field between the United States and the European Community....
Id.
222.

TREASURY NEWS, supra note 181, at 4.

223. See supra notes 200-213 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
226. Council Agrees, supra note 27, at 1.
227. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 28 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, ViceChairman, Fed).
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have a competitive advantage in the United States by virtue of European
integration. 22 The Community currently is moving towards universal
banking under the Second Banking Directive. As a result, large European banks will emerge as formidable competitors to United States
banks.22 9 Even though United States banks may enjoy expanded markets
in the Community due to the lack of functional borders, the European
"super banks" will compete with United States banks2 30 both in the
Community and in the United States.2" The inefficiencies in the United
States resulting from Glass-Steagall are a principal reason for the competitive advantage of European banks. 32 According to the United States,
because the Community already will have an advantage over United
States banks on account of their ability to consolidate and to engage in a
broad range of activities in Europe, the Community banks should not be
permitted to use reciprocity provisions to further exploit their advantage
within the United States.
Aside from increased competition, the integration may not cause the
United States to suffer any other ill effects. The Community banks may
prefer to change Glass-Steagall and certain state limitations, but these
laws will not cause the Community to exclude United States banks. 3 3
Regardless of access, United States banks already have begun to restructure their activities as a result of the currently reduced profit margins.2 34
These profit margins are not expected to increase in the unified market.
3. The United States Response to the Second Banking Directive
In the absence of any crisis, it is unlikely that Congress will take steps
to anticipate the integration of the Community market and expand
United States banking powers. 3 5 Similarly, the Bush Administration has

228. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 27 (statement of Rep. Hubbard).
229. TREASURY NEWS, supra note 181, at 5.
230. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 10 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency). Any expansion by United States banks in the Community will be
strictly in the wholesale field. Id. at 42 (statement of Sir Jeremy Morse, Chairman,
Lloyds Bank).
231. Id. at 8 (testimony of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC).
232. See id. at 34.
233. Id. at 34 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency). See

also EC Official Says U.S. Officials Satisfied with Draft Banking Standards, 52 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 1080, 1080 (Mar. 8, 1989) (statement of Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President,
European Community Commission).
234. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 4 (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, ViceChairman, Fed).
235. Id. at 19 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
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not provided Congress with any proposals for restructuring United
States financial institutions, 2 6 although the Administration claims it favors the repeal of Glass-Steagall. 3 7
After 1992, United States firms must open a subsidiary in at least one
Community country to obtain the single license. However, it appears
that many United States banks may not be interested in entering the
Community market. Noting that United States banks have been losing
their global market share in recent years, one industry professional in
the Community stated that there was no evidence that United States
banks have changed their strategic goals in light of the Community's
plan to consolidate the European market in 1992.38
V.

CONCLUSION

It is not clear whether the Community's transformation to a single
financial market will be a smooth one. According to one United States
Treasury official, the Community will have serious problems before
reaching its goals of a unified and efficient market.23 9 While noting that
integration inevitably will strengthen the Community market,240 this official stated that the Community will have difficulty adjusting to
problems that stem from the potential inability of a central authority to
manage regional variations in the etonomy and problems from different
currencies. 24' Thus, the United States worries may be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the Second Banking Directive emphasizes the problems that
exist in the United States system even without external pressure.
Apparently, United States banks are not contemplating significant expansion into the global market in the near future. United States banks,
however, would like to preserve their domestic market share. With the
advent of European "super banks," United States banks may find their
domestic market share declining. This would support the position that
Congress should act quickly to reduce the negative impact of the increase
in European competitiveness. The situation, however, may never rise to
236. See 1992 Poses Competitive Threat, supra note 168, at 466.
237. See EC Policy on Foreign Banks, supra note 160, at 647.
238. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 53 (testimony of Dr. Ernst-Moritz Lipp,
General Manager and Chief Economist, Dresdner Bank).
239. Id. at 89 (testimony of David C. Mulford, Under Secretary for Int'l Affairs,
Dep't of Treasury).
240. The measures already adopted by the Community will alter radically the economic and legal environment in which firms do business in the Community after 1992.
Jones, supra note 1, at 475-76.
241. 1989 Hearings,supra note 9, at 90-91 (testimony of David C. Mulford, Under
Secretary of Int'l Affairs, Dep't of Treasury).
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the critical level that would prompt Congress to act. Even if Congress
were to act,' both depositors' groups and investment banking groups
would lobby to limit the latitude of the banks' operations. The compromise required to enact this type of legislation could restrict severely its
ability to resolve the problems the United States currently confronts.
Thus, the regulators, with their own focus on the banking industry,
are the best governmental actors to address the problems of United States
banking regulatory structure. Though it takes time to litigate each of the
banking industry's innovative products, the regulators and their allies,
the courts, have shown that they will allow banks to expand the scope of
services offered. Both United States and Community banks will be
served best by incremental change from the regulators and courts, rather
than by sweeping and possibly protectionistic banking deregulatory
legislation.
Christopher T. Toll

